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This thesis deals with the ten years preceding Namibia's 
independence in March 1990. It examines the various characters 
and groups in this process, and how their roles delayed or 
promoted it. The era of Pieter W. Botha is very significant in 
that his rule brought many changes to the decision-making process 
and content of South African foreign policy. This period, 1978 -
1989, marked the formulation of the Total National Strategy in 
response to the Total Onslaught being waged on South Africa by 
perceived hostile external forces. 
Namibia's transition to independence suffered under this 
military-oriented policy as did the rest of the region. Never 
before in South Africa's policy-making history had the security 
sector played such a major role . Regional relations changed 
subsequent to the policy changes because of the distorted vision 
the Botha regime had of black-ruled states. Namibia was seen as 
an important pawn in the Total National Strategy as the last 
buffer state in Southern Africa protecting South Africa's white 
minority regime. 
INTRODUCTION 
"Then it came - betrayal, whimperingly, like a beaten 
dog, it cringed into the mouths of politicians: it 
was called ••• Resolution 435. And instead of kicking 
it back into the darkness that had spawned it, the 
politicians petted it, caressed it, nurtured it -
and accepted it. Resolution 435, the final betrayal 
of a nation, a land, a legion of dead and crippled 
young men." (Vrye Weekblad:6-l2/9/1991:8) 
"Swartmentse, wat ter wille van vrede in dieretuine 
tuishoort, is onintelligent wesens wat poskantore 
opblaas, hul hospitale met dooie en verminkte vroue 
en kinders volmaak en haatgevulde geskrifte skryf 
waarin totale uitwissing en verwoesting bepleit word." 
(Vrye Weekblad:6-12/9/1991:6) 
These two extracts epitomise the feelings of South African 
rightwingers toward the independence of Namibia and the black 
inhabitants of the Southern African region as a whole. This 
attitude is the legacy of the National Party's Apartheid policies 
since their accession to power in 1948. These policies created 
racial hatred and violence of an unprecedented nature. Also, by 
virtue of their dependency on South Africa, the Southern African 
states were plunged into a state of chaos as a consequence of the 
economic, military and political strategies employed by the South 
African government. 
The fight for independence in Namibia should be seen in this 
context of racial discrimination and the policies of the all-
powerful South African state. The role of the South African 
military in the Namibian independence process has been exposed 
in the alternative press (Weekly Mail, Vrye Weekblad, South, New 
Nation) and by various academics (Davies and O'Meara, Chan, 
Geldenhuys) . They have proved that the South African government 
used every possible means available to them to stall the 
inevitable, prior to but especially during the Botha era. None 
of the governments before 1978 wreaked as much damage on the 
region, in both economic and human terms, as did the Botha 
regime. 
Chapter One of this thesis will provide an historical foundation 
for the Botha era, for a country's present state cannot be 
analysed unless its past is understood. The united Nations' 
Security Council Resolution 435 took twelve years to be 
implemented. During this time the South African regime passed 
laws and set up structures such as the Turnhalle Conference, the 
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the Interim Assembly and the 
Multi-Party Conference as alternatives to the United Nations (UN) 
proposed measures. South Africa also used Namibia as a military 
springboard into Angola in the war against the latter state. 
Chapter two forms the theoretical framework of this paper. The 
basic premise is that a decision-making regime exists in the 
South African state . This paper examines the development of 
theories of foreign policy and offers a critique of the regime 
theory. Regime theory is then applied to the South African 
context in Chapter three in an attempt to prove that decision 
regimes exists in the policy- making structures . Kegley's regime 
analysis is used extensively due to its resourcefulness and 
applicability to the South African context . 
In chapters three and four regime theory is applied to Botha's 
Namibian policy, especially the Total National Strategy (TNS) 
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which was spawned of the 'total strategy' first espoused by Prime 
Minister BJ Vorster in the early 1970s. Pieter Willem Botha, the 
Defence Minister of the Vorster regime in 1978, developed the 
concept of total strategy into governmental policy. The strategy 
set the rules for foreign and domestic policies under the 
guidance of the state's highest decision-making body, the State 
Security Council (SSC). Through this body, the powers of the 
state were heightened and, due to the increased participation of 
the military in the decision-making structures, the nature of 
foreign and domestic policies became more militarised. These 
chapters will also examine the dualist policies of South Africa 
with regard to Namibia and the rest of the region . 
Following the analysis of the impact of TNS, an indepth study 
will be conducted of the roles the Western Contact Group and the 
UN played in the independence struggle of the Namibian people. 
The foreign policy of the united States of America's Reagan 
Administration toward South Africa will be under scrutiny because 
it played a significant role in stalling the independence process 
by linking the Namibian issue to the presence of the Cuban forces 
in Angola. 
The reasons for South Africa's behaviour in the negotiation 
process are varied. This study will attempt to clarify each 
reason and offer an overall analysis of the impact the Botha era 
had on the independence of Namibia . In conclusion, it will 
evaluate the applicability of the decision regime theory to 
Botha's foreign policy. 
CHAPTER 1 HISTORICAL SETTING 1974 - 1978 
South Africa's grand plan for Namibia began to take shape in 
1974. From the early years of Namibia's colonial history, it had 
been under the sway of imperial powers. The Germans colonised the 
area in 1884 and surrendered the territory to South Africa in 
1915 after the latter had defeated the Germans in Namibia during 
the ' First World War. From the outset the Namibian people were 
against colonial rule with the most notable revolts being the 
Great Uprising of 1903, the 1922 Bondelswarts protests and the 
1932 Ipumbu Revolt. The South West African People's Organisation 
(SWAPO), established in 1960, organised protests against colonial 
rule and fostered feelings of nationalism amongst the Namibian 
people which would ultimately lead to their independence. 
The South African colonial period was characterised by the policy 
of separate development and the regimented control of the labour 
force. The Odendaal Commission of 1964 laid the building blocks 
for the reserve policy when it proposed ten native homelands, a 
form of self-government, and white and coloured areas in the 
territory (Cockram:1970:24). Despite Vorster's meeting with the 
Special Representative of the UN General Secretary in 1972 where 
he agreed not to formally annex the territory, this policy still 
applied to Namibia since Vorster still regarded it as an integral 
part of South Africa (Jaster:1988:28). 
Prior to the dissolution of the League of Nations, Namibia was 
a 'c' mandate territory under the administration of South Africa. 
The League's Covenant instructed the mandatary to "promote to the 
utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress 
of the inhabitants" (Paragraph 1 Article 22 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations). However, when the United Nations was 
formed in 1946, South Africa refused to hand over its mandated 
territory to the Trusteeship Council which had taken over the 
colonised countries. 
South Africa had two main objectives for Namibia and these were 
to promote white rule in Namibia and to create a subordinate and 
malleable working class (Totemeyer: 1989: 3) . White rule in Namibia 
was crucial to South Africa's continued position as the regional 
power in Southern Africa. An additional reason behind South 
Africa's reluctance to release its mandate was that by 
maintaining Namibia as part of South Africa, it would be able to 
use it as a springboard into Angola thereby facilitating its 
attacks on SWAPO in that country. 
Prime Minister B.J Vorster was able to create "a period of great 
white confidence in South Africa's ability to ride out the storms 
and provide a secure future for its white inhabitants" 
(Geldenhuys: 1984: 34). Vorster was a diplomat by nature and 
consequently adopted an outward policy or detente initiative 
towards the rest of Africa. He had inherited a politically bleak 
landscape from Verwoerd. The Sharpeville uprisings in 1960 
heralded a new era in South African domestic politics and its 
repercussions reverberated into the 1970s. The hardening attitude 
of the international community after Sharpeville also created 
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problems for South Africa. International pressure increased when 
the South African government demonstrated its readiness to 
violently suppress any opposition to its power whether domestic 
or regional. 
As a result of South Africa's more belligerent stance and its 
reluctance to grant independence to Namibia, the people of 
Namibia formed liberation movements, and church, youth, cultural 
and worker pressure groups. The ideology of African Nationalism 
was a strong, binding aspect as "it sought to create a 
progressive, independent state and government •.• and to foster a 
spirit of collective purpose among all the people of Namibia" 
(Potholm and Dale:1972:88). SWAPO became the mouthpiece of the 
majority of Namibians at international forums like the UN and the 
Organisation for African Unity. In 1966 the UN declared South 
Africa's occupation illegal thereby giving the liberation 
movement increased leverage in its struggle against apartheid and 
colonial rule. SWAPO re-evaluated its diplomatic methods in 1966 
and decided to "change tactics when it became clear that 
petitioning the UN and pursuing a non-violent approach in the 
nationalist struggle was not going to produce the desired 
results" (Katjavivi :1988:570). 
Throughout the 1970 's, the legitimacy of the South African 
government was being challenged. The National Party government 
faced an organic crisis which had its roots within the domestic 
political arena and within the party itself. Its legitimacy was 
under siege amongst the disenfranchised black majority and was 
8 
challenged by party hardliners who opposed the type of reform 
that Vorster propagated. The Rhodesian talks were cancelled, the 
Portuguese coup in 1974 against the Caetano regime delivered 
independence for Mozambique and Angola, and internal opposition 
to the National Party became more vociferous. These changes 
affected both the regional and domestic policies of South Africa 
leading to a more security-orientated policy being developed. The 
sacred cordon sanitaire was being threatened by the newly 
independent Marxist-Leninist Frontline States. Angola's 
independence posed significant problems because it meant that 
Namibia was the only buffer state between communist Africa and 
white-ruled South Africa. It also implied that an MPLA (People's 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government in Angola would 
be more sympathetic to SWAPO guerrillas thereby giving them a 
broader base from which to operate against South African forces 
in Namibia. 
In an University of Cape Town Honours' thesis entitled Not Giving 
Peace a Chance - Why Namibia Did Not Achieve Independence in 1978 
(unpublished), Dean Prinsloo is cited as saying that the 
independence of these states was countered by South Africa 
tightening its hold on Namibia by passing 
"a resolution in which it extended an invitation 
to all the population groups in the territory to 
come together in consultation with the aim of finding 
a political solution which will ensure that they will 
be able to live in peace, safety and prosperity in SWA 
in such a way that the interests of minority groups will 
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properly be taken into account" (Collins : 1990:10). 
In doing this, South Africa attempted to set up a moderate front 
of indigenous Namibian groups as an viable alternative to a 
possible SWAPO government. 1975 has been acknowledged as a 
watershed year for Southern Africa. On the international level, 
Britain terminated the 1955 Simonstown Agreement thereby 
effectively ending the hopes of the South African government of 
becoming an integral part of Western defence. 
1975 also brought further attempts by the South African regime 
to manipulate Namibia's political development. The first 
ethnically based conference was held in the Turnhalle building 
in Windhoek in September 1975 . The meeting became known as the 
Turnhalle Conference. Serfontein was correct in stating that the 
"only thing the Turnhalle talks had achieved was to give 
apartheid and discrimination ' a new mask' by pretending that a 
new era was being entered into" (1976:284) . South Africa was 
prepared to set up a puppet government in Namibia as an 
alternative to the UN proposed negotiations with SWAPO and all 
the other parties in Namibia. A Declaration of Intent was drawn 
up after the first session which called for a constitution within 
three years. "It was important primarily for its clear and 
unequivocal rejection of force to obtain independence or change" 
(Carter and O'Meara eds:1979 : 160). 
The Turnhalle Conference set up power-sharing structures with the 
white minority political groups having more power than the 
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ethnically based groups . It leaned toward "consociation ••• with 
a strong element of group autonomy " (Leistner and Esterhuysen 
eds:1991:45). The homelands or reserve system provided a 
conceptual base for the Conference providing ethnic voting blocs 
and delegates . Since the delegates were chosen by the South 
African government, this effectively sabotaged any chance of the 
Conference being accepted internationally . Another negative point 
was that SWAPO was excluded from the proceedings. Rotberg claims 
that the Conference was "designed to perpetuate white control 
over the kinds of governmental functions that most affected 
whites . Housing, educational and medical segregation would, in 
effect, continue" (1981:198). South Africa also increased its 
estrangement in the region by launching Operation Savannah 
against Angola in 1975. It became apparent that although South 
Africa was willing to engage in talks with certain sectors of the 
Namibian political arena, it remained intent on crushing SWAPO 
militarily and intimidating its regional supporters. 
In 1976 the Turnhalle talks became more intense due to increased 
international pressure on South Africa. The 1976 Soweto Riots and 
resulting suppression by the government evoked widespread 
disapproval from the international community. A constitutional 
committee was set up under Dirk Mudge to create an interim 
government which would draft a constitution for an independent 
Namibia (Barber and Barratt:1990:200) . The proposed date of 
independence was 31 December 1978. UN Resolution 385 had given 
the South African government and army until the end of August 
1976 to withdraw from the territory. The Tur nhalle Conference 
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then produced a statement of principles in August promising 
independence by the agreed date in 1978. This document had not 
been signed by South Africa and therefore this country could not 
be held liable for any actions which went against its principles. 
Davis and Landis (Leistner and Esterhuysen eds:1978:162) argue 
that the statement proposed 
"a different future for Namibia: the continuation 
of black domination by whites; the continuation of 
Bantustans; and the continuation of foreign 
exploitation of Namibia's vast mineral resources 
without the benefit to the general black population. 
The major differences would be the existence of formal 
independence and the creation of a government in which 
a number of blacks would play visible roles". 
This was not what the Namibian people needed nor what the 
international community was requesting. South Africa had followed 
this road with minor reforms (such as the participation of 
moderate black delegates) but devised the plan in such a way as 
to limit the ultimate level of reform that occurred . 
In 1976 Turnhalle delegates wished to involve SWAPO in the talks 
in an effort to give the proceedings more legitimacy but they 
failed because SWAPO had resolved not to participate in a South 
African sponsored plan. 
"The Dakar Declaration of 1976 recognised 
SWAPO as the only legitimate representative 
of the Namibian people, denounced South Africa's continued 
illegal occupation and its usage of 
Namibia for attacking Angola, and endorsed SWAPO's argument 
that when all other means have failed armed struggle is a 
legitimate and justified means of liberation" 
(Serfontein:1976:338). 
The UN's support of SWAPO was a setback for the Turnhalle 
Conference yet South Africa refused to abandon the process. 
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The Turnhalle talks continued despite widespread opposition and 
in effect did not constitute a victory for the Namibian people . 
In 1977 it passed legislation which set up a three-tier 
government based purely along ethnic lines. The first tier was 
the local government, the second the regional and the third the 
national or central government. According to Dirk Mudge, leader 
of the white delegation, the rationale behind this was that "one 
of the conditions for success of the Conference was that the 
'existence of separate ethnic groups must be recognised'" (Barber 
and Barratt:1990:200). 
The Western Nations also supported a swift independence for 
Namibia due to the threat of Cuban involvement in Angola in 
support of its MPLA government. The main incentive which brought 
the united States to this point was its fear of the Cold War 
being transferred to Sub-Saharan Africa. united States Secretary 
of State, Henry Kissinger, stated that the United States was 
demanding "an early independence, SWAPO participation in any 
future constitutional discussions and UN control or observation 
of elections" (Serfontein: 1976: 355). A Western bloc needed to be 
formed in order to counter the perceived drive of communism 
through Southern Africa. The Western Nations objected to the 
Turnhalle Conference and, as an alternative, proposed a joint 
initiative under the auspices of the Western Contact Group. The 
Group was made up of three permanent members of the Security 
Council: the United States, the united Kingdom, France, and two 
addi tional members, Canada and West Germany. The Group was 
established as a means to guard Western interests in Southern 
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Africa . Katjavivi claims that "They •.. wanted to avoid a 
radicalisation of Southern Africa through a long-drawn-out armed 
liberation struggle, since this might jeopardise their long-term 
economic and strategic interests in the area" (1988: 114). Its 
proposals were delivered to Vorster in 1977 and were the basic 
tenets of united Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 385 
(1976). 
This resolution called for UN supervised elections, the release 
of political prisoners, the free return of Namibian exiles, and 
the cancellation of the Turnhalle Conference and its proposals 
(Barber and Barratt:1990:222). In August 1977 the appointment of 
Judge M.T Steyn as Administrator General marked the end of the 
Turnhalle era . 
South Africa had rejected the proposals tabled by the Contact 
Group yet had to concede victory to the latter because of various 
pressures facing South Africa. One major issue was the UN Arms 
Embargo of 1977 which limited the trade of arms between South 
Africa and the rest of the world. The 1976 uprisings also 
heightened the internal pressure to effect a resolution of the 
Namibian question. The international community's response also 
increased pressure on South Africa to affect meaningful change. 
Barber and Barratt argue that 
"Pretoria, succumbing to the mounting 
pressures, had to revert to the international 
track of its two-track policy. Vorster had in 
effect lost the initiative on Namibia, as he 
had on detente, and moreover he was now faced 
with a serious domestic racial crisis which 
aroused international opinion against his 
government as never before" (1990 : 203). 
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Serfontein labels South Africa's concession to the Group as " (a) 
face-saving device to avoid a public embarrassment and political 
humiliation for Vorster ••• even it was detrimental to South 
Africa's self- interest" (1976:364). However, he argues that the 
Turnhalle talks came too late and gave too little in terms of 
power to the Namibian people. It was also run from Pretoria, had 
no legal authority and was not strong enough to survive without 
the support of the South African regime (Serfontein : 1976 : 369). 
1977 marked the year of changes in the united States' relations 
with South Africa. united States President Jimmy Carter was 
elected on a human rights ticket and this affected his 
administration's policies towards racist South Africa . In Rotberg 
and Barratt's book Conflict and Compromise in South Africa 
(1980: 24), Dugard claims that the Carter administration was 
accused of attempting to prescribe a solution to South Africa's 
problems and of using the issue for its own domestic gain. 
Kissinger was replaced by Cyrus Vance, and Andrew Young became 
the United States representative at the UN . By the end of May 
1977, Vorster declared that a Central Administrative Authority 
would be set up in Namibia to provide a transitional body until 
the permanent government could be set up after independence. He 
also gave the Administrator General more powers to deal with the 
political problems arising in Namibia prior to independence . 
Vorster misjudged Steyn who immediately began effecting 
meaningful reform by repealing the Mixed Marriages Act and 
modifying the pass laws (Carter and O'Meara eds:1978:169) . 
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The Turnhalle Conference collapsed in 1977 with the appointment 
of the Administrator General and the announcement by Vorster that 
an interim government would not be set up by the Conference. 
Steyn managed to maintain order yet promote meaningful social 
change (Rotberg:1981:203). Vorster had also ended the Turnhalle's 
constitution-making role and provided for a transitional 
administration (Totemeyer and Seiler: 1980: 91) . This was the first 
major concession that Vorster had made in terms of granting 
Namibia space to make her own decisions. It resulted in the 
breakaway of the Dirk Mudge contingent and other moderate black 
leaders. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) was formed in 
order to offer a middle road for voters not wishing to vote for 
the National Party nor SWAPO. In retrospect, however, the 
Turnhalle talks were doomed to failure for various reasons. The 
formation of a centrist political force led to a realignment of 
parties in Namibia and subsequently a changed balance of power. 
The controversy surrounding the talks stimulated political debate 
in South Africa which left the government uncomfortable. 
Furthermore, the realisation that the talks were not 
internationally acceptable led to a scramble for other diplomatic 
solutions such as the Western Contact Group (Leistner and 
Esterhuysen eds:1991:4S). 
The negotiations between South Africa, the Contact Group and 
Namibia started in February 1978. This process was stalled by 
both South Africa and SWAPO at various stages. South Africa did 
not wish to relinquish power over the independence process but 
was forced to because of internal and international pressure. 
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SWAPO did not trust its country's occupier and yet it was forced 
to continue the talks by the Front Line States (FLS) of Angola 
and Mozambique. The 'proximity talks ' began in February in New 
York in an attempt to break the stalemate in negotiations . 
Neither South Africa nor SWAPO wished to attend meetings together 
and therefore a shuttle system was devised which allocated times 
to each party for negotiation via the mediator : the Contact 
Group. 
In April 1978, after many alterations to the original document 
which had been based on UNSC Resolution 385 (1976), the Contact 
Group tabled its proposals. These included the role of the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in determining 
the size of the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), the 
agreement that the Administrator General would retain power over 
the Namibian police, that the wishes of the constituent assembly 
would be considered during UN supervised elections and that the 
South African forces would be confined to two bases 
(Katjavivi: 1988: 118-119). Free and fair elections under the 
control of the UN were to be held after four months . 
Watts reports that South Africa accepted these agreements in 
April and simultaneously launched Operation Reindeer into Angola 
in an attempt to destroy SWAPO bases at Cassinga 
(Rotberg:1983:21). Operations Daisy and Protea were launched 
before the final agreement between the two parties was reached. 
Walvis Bay was excluded from these proposals as the negotiators 
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felt that the issue would antagonise the South African and SWAPO 
contingents. 
The talks were scuttled by the abrupt departure of the South 
African Foreign Minister, pik Botha. He claimed that his power 
to make decisions had been limited and needed to return to 
receive further direction from the South African government. One 
important aspect to be noted during this period was that South 
Africa attended the talks and appeared to be willing to grant 
independence to Namibia but yet continued to follow its two-
pronged strategy with military attacks on SWAPO bases, Namibian 
civilians and the FLS. Proclamation AG 26 by South Africa 
permitted the Administrator General to arrest the internal 
executive of SWAPO for impeding the flow of law and order in 
Namibia (To Be Born A Nation:1987:240). Esterhuysen asserts that 
the South African strategy was twofold as it continued the 
"international negotiation in terms of R385 and the steering of 
internal political developments in such as way as to present the 
international community and SWAPO with a series of faits 
accomplis" (Leistner and Esterhuysen eds:1991:46). 
This dualist policy created distrust and tensions in the 
negotiation process. South Africa accused the UN and the Contact 
Group of being biased towards SWAPO and SWAPO believed the 
opposite due to the Western nations' trading links with South 
Africa . Stanley Uys reported in the Rand Daily Mail (11/7/1978) 
that there were two factors pushing SWAPO to a regional 
settlement with the Western Contact Group. The Frontline States 
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were pressurising Namibia for the sake of regional peace and 
dissention in the upper ranks of SWAPO regarding a settlement 
created a favourable negotiating atmosphere. The UNSC Resolution 
431 was finally accepted on the 27 July 1978. 
"By this resolution, the Security Council 
took note of the proposal for a settlement 
of the Namibian situation and requested that 
the Secretary-General appoint a Special Representative 
for Namibia 'to ensure the early independence 
of Namibia through free elections under the 
supervision and control of the united Nations'. 
The resolution also requested that the 
Secretary-General submit a report 
recommendations for the settlement 
situation" (United Nations:1988:1). 
containing his 
of the Namibian 
Martti Ahtisaari was elected as Special Representative and first 
visited Namibia and South Africa in August 1978. To add insult 
to injury, on the same day that R431 was ratified by the Security 
Council, R432 was also passed. It stated that Walvis Bay was an 
integral part of Namibia therefore South Africa should return the 
enclave to its rightful owners. Barber and Barratt state that 
this resolution was a compromise to meet SWAPO's concerns and to 
obtain support for R431, but Pretoria furiously reacted against 
it, and although Pretoria reiterated its acceptance in principle 
of the Western proposals, doubts and mistrusts were emerging yet 
again . These were compounded by disputes over the interim 
arrangements, with Pretoria suspicious that the UN was attempting 
to take control rather than monitor the situation (1990:224). 
In September 1978 Vorster resigned from his position as Prime 
Minister and affirmed South Africa's intention to proceed with 
its own election plans (Carter and O'Meara eds:1979:173). South 
Africa rejected the proposed size of the UNTAG forces and the 
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extent of power held by the Special Representative, and 
criticised the Representative's failure to consult with the 
Administrator General. Pretoria also opposed the reduction of its 
troop size and the fact that they were to be confined to two 
bases. As a result of this, the Administrator General passed AG37 
calling for Namibians to register for an election in opposition 
to the Western plan. 
Vorster's defence minister, Pieter Willem Botha took over the 
reigns of government on the 28 September 1978, a day before UNSC 
Resolution 435 was passed. This resolution was an amalgamation 
of R385, R431 and R432. It decided to establish UNTAG for a 
maximum period of twelve months in order to assist the Special 
Representative to ensure the independence of Namibia via free and 
fair elections. The resolution welcomed the willingness of SWAPO 
to co-operate and adhere to the call for a ceasefire, requested 
that South Africa co-operate with the Secretary General, and 
declared that any non-UN supervised actions by the South African 
administration were to be regarded as illegal (PCR 
Information: 1988:25) . 
Despite the signing of R435, South Africa continued to press for 
elections in Namibia before the end of 1978. The DTA won the 
election which was regarded as being a farce because of the 
absence of SWAPO and other left-wing parties. In an interview 
with DTA member, Moses Kozonguizi stated that the DTA won 41 of 
the 50 seats in the Constituent Assembly elections in 1978. At 
the time South Africa claimed that the elections were for a 
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National Assembly which would aid the Administrator General. The 
constituent Assembly was only upgraded to a National Assembly in 
1980. On the one hand South Africa argued with the UN on the 
other South Africa was concerned with setting up opposition 
structures. 
Domestically Vorster had also failed to create an environment in 
Namibia that was either internally or externally acceptable. The 
Soweto uprising had also come at a very inopportune moment when 
UNSC R385 demanded the withdrawal of the Republic by August 1976, 
the Turnhalle conference had not been granted international 
acceptance and the UN's Council for Namibia was set up "to act 
as formal administrative authority in exile" (Rotberg: 1981: 199). 
All these setbacks challenged the South African government to 
change its racist policies . 
The 1976 uprisings became a national struggle waged at the 
schools, factories, mines, churches, etcetera. 
"In short, and at the risk of stating the 
obvious, the organised mass struggle of 1976 
manifested a total rejection of white domination 
and a revolutionary movement for a fundamental 
change in the balance of power" (Lodge:1983 : 334). 
The increased pressure from the UN on the Namibian independence 
issue led to an escalation of domestic unrest within South 
Africa. The MPLA and Frelimo victories in the old Portuguese 
colonies had done much to encourage liberatory sentiment in 
Southern Africa. The liberation movements still waging their 
struggles in the region received more attention from the 
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international community as the South African government increased 
its repression. 
The economic crisis of the 1970s also created major problems for 
the National Party. The capitalist class called for reform in 
labour control practices in an attempt to maintain profit 
margins . The right-wingers opposed any reform which would grant 
the black citizens any leverage in the political arena. In 
effect, the National Party was being faced by the worst crisis 
it had ever experienced since 1948. In an article titled 
"'Muldergate' and the Politics of Afrikaner Nationalism", Dan 
O'Meara states that 
"(t)he verligte wing began to push for far-reaching policy 
reforms, particularly with respect to 
labour and state control of the economy ••. The 
right was demanding a maintenance of tight influx control 
measures, restrictions on the employment 
of skilled African labour, no form of recognition 
of African trade unions and continued state control 
of the infra structural sectors of the economy" 
(Work in Progress 22:1982:11). 
During the most intense period of negotiation over the Namibian 
independence process, Vorster made the biggest mistake of his 
career: Muldergate. It emerged that the Bureau of State Sec uri ty, 
the Department of Information and other conservative National 
Party members attempted to win domestic and foreign public 
support by financing the English medium pro-government newspaper 
The Citizen with money from the Information Department. 
"The multi-million dollar campaign had been 
attempting for six years to use public funds, 
without the knowledge of Parliament , to influence 
media, politicians, and other opinion makers in 
the United States, Europe, and Africa" (Hachten and 
Giffard : 1984:230) . 
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This effectively destroyed National Party conservative, Connie 
Mulder's, chances of running for election in 1978. The period 
during which these attempts at media manipulation were most 
intense coincided with the Turnhalle Conference in Namibia, the 
negotiation process with the Contact Group, and the passing of 
UNSC R385, R431 and R432. These right-wingers felt that the 
Vorster government was becoming too reformist and attempted to 
curb this by means of pro-South African propaganda. Despite these 
underhand tactics, the Contact Group threatened to apply 
sanctions against South Africa. The UN Arms Embargo of 1977 was 
an example of the extent of the pressure the Group was willing 
to apply. 
From this overview, it is clear that the UN's role up till 1978 
in the process towards Namibia's independence was often 
perfunctory in spite of the popular support its resolutions 
amassed. It was not until the Marxist governments of Angola and 
Mozambique had demonstrated their fortitude that the Western 
powers in the UNSC came to regard Southern Africa as a region 
requiring their sustained attention. The presence of Cuban troops 
in Angola after South Africa's failed invasion in 1976 added a 
note of urgency to their efforts to avert protracted liberatory 
wars and another intractable Cold War arena. With UNSC Resolution 
435, the UN sought to make its role in Namibia far more 
sustained, coherent and effective. UNSC R435 marked a new era 
for Namibia as well as South Africa and indeed the region as a 
whole. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theory of International Relations has evolved immensely since 
the start of the twentieth century. Not only have the theoretical 
analyses developed quantitatively but they have also become more 
qualitative. K.J Holsti (1983) sets out the development of the 
approaches to the study of International Politics. The 
traditionalists, the grand theorists, the middle-range analysts 
and the 'peace researchers' have contributed greatly to the 
development of the discipline (1983:8-12). Lloyd Jensen's work, 
Explaining Foreign Policy (1982), also posits various models of 
analysis of foreign policy-making. These include the strategic 
or rational model which attempts to open Easton's 'black box', 
the decision-making approach which has become the main area of 
investigation, the bureaucratic politics model which examines the 
roles played by the various bureaucracies, the adaptive model 
which attempts to explain how constraints and opportunities 
determine a state's policy, and finally, the incremental 
decision-making model which argues that because of the large 
array of options, foreign policy-makers tend to "tinker" with 
existing policies (1982: 5-9). Despite this array of models, 
Charles Kegley asserts that research has reached an impasse 
because political analysts have not paid much attention to the 
formulation of foreign policy (Hermann et al:l987:247). 
At this point it would be useful to define the concept of foreign 
policy. It encapsulates both the means and the ends of the 
external relationships of the government in question. 
"We will view foreign policy as a set of 
authoritative decisions taken in the name 
24 
of the state that are intended to achieve 
certain goals in the international arena. 
In other words, foreign in foreign policy 
applies to anything beyond the legal 
boundaries of a particular state; and 
policy we define as a guide to action intended 
to realise the goals a state (i.e authoritative 
decision makers) has set for itself" 
(Toma and Gorman:1991:120). 
The ends and means theory is supported by Couloumbis and Wolfe's 
definition (1978:89) which states that "foreign policy consists 
of two (fundamental) elements: national objectives to be achieved 
and means for achieving them". A state needs to examine the 
closest end to their objectives. There are many constraints that 
obstruct the achievement of the objectives. The domestic and 
international milieu have great influence on state policy. Also, 
as Kissinger states, "the domestic structure crucially affects 
the way the actions of other states are interpreted"; in other 
words, the foreign policy (Kissinger in Hanreider:1971:24) . 
The concept of foreign-policy has been delineated into 
comparative studies of foreign policy-making, the study of the 
behaviour of policy-makers and the analysis of the rationale that 
lies behind specific policies. According to Wilkenfeld and 
associates, 
"(f)irst foreign policy indicators 
should rely upon structured observations and codifications 
of interstate events . Second, the individual foreign policy 
actions of a state, 
described as events, should relate to a portrayal 
of foreign policy activity. Third, the foreign 
policy events should provide information pertaining 
both to state behaviour and to actions with are 
initiated by other states and may affect foreign 
policy (as a part of the interstate component)" (1980:114) . 
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Their investigation of foreign policy behaviour is invaluable as 
it deals with a review and critique of existing frameworks and 
offers an entirely new analysis by means of the Interstate 
Behaviour Analysis (IBA) framework . Five variable areas are 
identified: decision-maker values, public opinion, economic 
indicators, international trade and international organisation 
memberships (Wilkenfeld et al:l980:34) . 
Despite this large array of analyses, there is a paucity of 
analysis that looks at South African foreign policy in depth. 
There have been scholars like Greg Mills who, in his doctoral 
thesis entitled South Africa: The Total National Strategy and 
Regional Policy During the Botha Years, 1978 1989 
(Lancaster: 1990) ,examined PW Botha's regional policy. His policy 
analysis is of great significance yet it does not entail a 
theoretical analysis of how policy is arrived at . In other words, 
what determines policy at a theoretical level? 
Garth Sheldon's article deals with foreign policy-making in South 
Africa (Politikon Vol13/No1:1986). Sheldon examines in three 
distinct phases the making of foreign policy in the South African 
context. The first deals with competition and conflict between 
the decision-makers whether they be military or civil. Phase two 
provides insight into departmental disagreements, and phase three 
examines the choice of an alternative via competition and 
consensus (Politikon Vol13/No1:1986:6-7). He attempts to 
eliminate the "shopping list approach" that has been previously 
adopted and " (concentrates) on identifying, ranking and 
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explaining internal and external source variables which are 
demonstrably crucial to South Africa's foreign policy decision 
making process" (Politikon VoI13/No1:1986:16). His level of 
analysis is sophisticated yet the study seems to lack insight 
into domestic policy-making. Sheldon only examines two "key" 
internal sources of pressure: the white sector of the population 
and the business community (Politikon Voll3/No1: 1986: 11). Foreign 
policy is determined by domestic policy, and therefore his 
omission of this factor creates a lack of in-depth analysis. For 
instance, South African liberation movements played a significant 
role over the long-term as a pressure group and, as a result of 
this pressure, South African foreign policy was compelled to 
change. 
The main body of theoretical analysis deals with foreign policy-
making in the core of the world system, as Pat McGowan prefers 
to term it. These economically stronger countries, as opposed to 
the lesser developed countries (1991: 11), have received more 
analytical attention than the latter. Many authors are also 
Western writers who analyse from their specific world-view. 
However, due to the lack of African analyses of foreign policy-
making, the existing methods of analysis will have to be employed 
in this paper. 
The available frameworks of analysis deal with the development 
of foreign policy as a result of observable external and internal 
pressures. JJ Van Wyk states that "foreign policy behaviour could 
be described as any observable activity where the government of 
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a society interacts with other governments that are part of the 
society's external environment" (International Affairs Bulletin 
VoI12/No2:1988:42). His analysis deals with the novel approach 
of events-data in South Africa. Holsti, in his book International 
Politics: A Framework for Analysis (1983:21), asserts the 
following: 
"The student who analyses the actions of a state 
toward external environment and the conditions 
- usually domestic - under which those actions are 
formulated is concerned essentially with foreign 
policy" • 
He also defines policy as being "the decisions that define goals, 
set precedents, or lay down courses of action, and the actions 
taken to implement those decisions" (Holsti:1983:21). Firstly, 
this definition only examines those aspects of foreign policy-
making that are observable, and secondly, it ignores a whole 
plethora of effects that determine which policy finally gets 
accepted and applied. Those aspects which are not observable are 
found in the external and domestic environments but have not been 
included by Holsti in this particular definition. In all 
fairness, Holsti does analyse foreign policy outputs as a 
consequence of orientations and roles of the states, and the 
psychological make up of the decision-makers which, together, 
constitute the whole (1983). Pat McGowan cites Dessler as saying 
there are 
,,'two uncontentious truths about social life'. 
The first truth is that the events, outcomes 
and actions of the social world are the product 
of human agency - the observable, real 
undertakings and projects of individual men 
and women acting alone and in groups and 
organisations such as the state. 
The second truth is that human agency can only 
take place in concrete historical circumstances 
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that 'condition the possibilities for action 
and influence its course'" (International Affairs 
Bulletin VoI13/No3:1989:39). 
McGowan further argues that new criteria should be found in order 
to examine the effects that different types of structural factors 
will have on the process of foreign policy-making and the 
implementation of those policies (International Affairs Bulletin 
VoI13/No3:1989 : 52) . 
Joe Hagan, in a chapter titled "Regimes, Political Oppositions, 
and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy" (Hermann et 
al:1987) proposes four basic sets of actors affecting foreign 
policy, as opposed to McGowan's structural characteristics. 
Personali ty, factional and bureaucratic leadership divisions, 
legislative and non-executive actors sharing power with the 
executive, politically active segments of society in the form of 
bureaucratic and interest group actors and, finally, the less 
structured activity of the mass public by means of opinion polls 
and civil unrest all affect foreign policy. Hagan attributes 
changes in foreign policy largely to the internal dynamics of a 
country. 
One common underlying concept in these definitions is 
'observable' human behaviour. However, human behaviour is 
conducted within an environment, and the cultures and norms of 
that sphere will be manifest in that person's actions . There is 
the added issue of socialisation of the person which is a 
conglomeration of genetic, psychological and sociological 
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characteristics. This combination is what the theoreticians are 
examining in foreign policy analysis. Kegley asserts that 
"we've been asked to believe that foreign 
policy behaviours are influenced almost 
exclusively by the internal characteristics 
of nations or the attributes of those nation's 
external environments " (Hermann et al:1987:248). 
Easton's 'black box' theory, as mentioned in Kegley's chapter in 
New Directions in the Making of Foreign Policy (Hermann et 
al:1987:248), has been discounted because it views the 
formulation of policy in a closed environment which is not open 
to examination by researchers . By opening the 'box', analysts 
have discovered a new area of analysis which casts a completely 
new light on the foreign policy of a country. Hagan quotes 
Wilkenfeld as follows: "there were 'large gaps ••• in existing 
literature on foreign policy and political phenomena'" (Hermann 
et al:1987:340). 
In addition to the analysis of the environment that policy-makers 
are located in, a theory of ends and means has evolved. 
Couloumbis and Wolfe define foreign policy as "consist(ing) of 
two (fundamental) elements: national objectives to be achieved 
and means for achieving them" (1978: 89) . A state needs to examine 
the means at its disposal in order to achieve the closest end to 
their objectives. 
This definition is guided by the belief system of policy-makers 
because the national objectives are determined by the ideals and 
beliefs of the people within that country. The means are chosen 
by virtue of the policy-makers' norms and their understanding of 
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their roles in the world, their region and in their domestic 
environs. "Holsti's typology of political belief systems is 
based upon the assumption that a leader's views on the nature of 
the world are 'master' beliefs and constrain the individual's 
other political beliefs" (International Affairs Bulletin 
Vol13/No3:l989:71). 'Belief systems' are also known as the 
'operational codes' of a society. Therefore the choices made by 
the policy-makers are accepted as those that set the boundaries 
of action in that particular country. Alternatives do exist but 
they are discounted as not being the norm. 
The analysis of policy-makers as a variable has led to new 
approaches being developed. Regime analysis has been developed 
by scholars like Young (1982), Puchala and Hopkins (1982), Kegley 
(1987) and Hagan (1987). Lisa Thompson's thesis entitled "SADCC-
Part of the whole or whole of the part?" (Rhodes 
University:1989) uses Young's definition of regimes in her paper. 
Young defines regimes as the "conjunction of convergent 
expectations and patterns of behaviour in practise" 
(Thompson:1989). In the same paper, Puchala and Hopkins are said 
to agree that regimes "exist as participants' understandings, 
expectations or convictions about legitimate or moral behaviour 
(Thompson:1989:246). Charles Kegley's states that 
"regimes are generally believed to come 
into being in response to perceived problems, 
to develop among parties that share a common 
problem, and to be created from the mutual 
interests of these parties to cooperate in 
order to find solutions to the shared 
problems" (Kegley in Hermann et al:1987:250). 
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Regimes arose because of the need to regulate the making of 
choices by decision-makers in accordance with the rules and norms 
of their belief systems. 
Hagan further develops the theory by arguing that though regimes 
exist, they are not infallible as there are various conditions 
and effects that change them. He proposes that the extent of 
vulnerability and fragmentation that occur at various levels and 
times are the main proponents of change in regimes. 
Regime theory lends an innovative level to analysis that mere 
behavioural theories do not achieve. Kegley's invaluable chapter 
entitled "Decision Regimes and the Comparative Study of Foreign 
Policy" develops the argument that 
"in asking us to take into account human actions, 
it demands that we escape the deterministic logic 
that has attempted to explain national behaviour 
abroad by reference exclusively to the political, 
social and economic forces that influence decisions, 
but not by reference to the decision makers who, 
in the last analysis, do the deciding" (Kegley in 
Hermann et al:1987:249). 
Regime theory does need to be evaluated in order to determine 
whether it has achieved what it set out to prove: regimes dictate 
the policy makers' choices. 
In the process of answering this question, Kegley's regime theory 
will be set out in this paper as it is a noted source about 
regimes and the forms in which they manifest themselves. As 
opposed to plain regimes, he distinguishes substantive and 
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procedural decision regimes. Decision regimes tend to materialise 
to shape foreign policy making and 
"may emerge when there is leadership 
consensus regarding the substance of policy 
as well as the process by which it is made. 
The former are termed substantive decision 
regimes, the latter procedural decision regimes" 
(Hermann et al:l987:252). 
Substantive regimes exist if there is consensus about the 
substance of the nation's foreign and domestic policies. This 
implies that the belief systems or operational codes of the 
decision-makers are similar or are at least open to negotiation. 
Power struggles are not excluded from this type of decision 
regime. 
Coalitions form in every institution in society as a recognition 
of the necessity to co-operate in order to present an inviolable 
policy and a united front to foreign countries . This minimises 
the vulnerability and chances of fragmentation occurring in 
regimes. Many governments are threatened by internal and external 
opposition which in turn weakens the resolve of the said 
government to implement a particular policy. This opposition also 
adversely affects the coalitions within the government decision-
making structures. Hagan identifies four basic sets of actors 
affecting foreign policy: 
"leadership divisions (such as personality, 
factional and bureaucratic differences), 
legislative and non-executive actors sharing 
power with the executive politically active 
segments of society in the form of bureaucratic 
and interest group actors, and the less structured 
activity of the mass public (in the form of opinion 
polls and civil unrest)" (Hagan in Hermann et 
al:l987:342). 
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Hagan's choice of actors is not new. Wilkenfeld et al (1980) and 
Jensen (1982) used the same variables in their academic analysis. 
Hagan does, however, introduce two new variables which affect 
foreign policy. He argues that the vulnerability and the 
fragmentation levels affect foreign policy-making in a state. He 
adds that these variables affect consensus in and also confront 
the legitimacy of the regime (Hagan in Hermann et al:1987:344). 
To continue, Kegley's more extensive definition of a substantive 
decision regime states that 
"substantive regimes are predicated on a 
negotiated view of global reality and a 
nation's place in it •.• By operating as an 
expression of the broad aims of a society 
in its relations with actors beyond its 
borders, substantive decision regimes 
contribute to the definition of a nation's 
foreign policy goals" (Kegley in Hermann et 
al: 1987: 254) • 
The perceptions of the foreign policy-maker are vital to the 
decision-making process. Shared perceptions lead to shared aims 
which in turn affect the decisions taken. This introduces the 
ends and means theory which many theorists have utilised in their 
analyses. The ends of any foreign policy are agreed upon within 
the substantive regime. The means are contested by various 
bureaucracies within the decision-making process and manifest 
themselves in the procedural regimes. These regimes arise out of 
a need to adapt uniformly to changes occurring internationally 
and domestically in terms of the goals (or ends) the government 
has set for itself. Young claims that these changes or 
alterations to regimes do not take place peacefully but rather 
as a result of pressure both from within the ruling party and 
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class and from the masses (Thompson:1989:). This is the power 
relationship Olson identified between two states (1987:227). 
Regime analysis has its merits and demerits. Kegley's 
diagrammatical exposition of the foreign policy decision-making 
process is valuable in that he has yet again pioneered another 
method of analysis. The methods of research developed by other 
theorists have become over-used therefore a fresh approach opens 
previously closed doors. The relationship between inputs and 
outputs in the decision-making process is clearly outlined in 
Kegley's diagram (figure 2.1). Regime analysis operates on the 
premise that the policy-maker's belief system or 'operational 
code' is the most important issue in decision-making for, as 
Kegley argues, 
"policy maker's behaviours and cognitions 
may be assumed to be the factors that 
directly determine foreign policy behaviour 
- not the internal and external conditions 
operative at the point of decision. National 
and international circumstances do not make 
decisions and forge foreign policy; decision 
-makers alone do this" 
(Kegley in Hermann et al:1987:248). 
Kegley fails to mention that beliefs are formed by living in a 
particular environment and by being socialised in a particular 
way. The external and domestic environments in which the policy-
maker has to decide on policy are therefore the most important 
aspects in policy formulation. As Wilkenfeld and his associates 
state: 
"foreign policy behaviours may be classified 
in terms of 'who does what to whom, where, 
when, and in what immediate context?'" (1980:36). 
The full picture needs to be analysed. 
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One problem with regime analysis is that the research of human 
behaviour is conducted on an entirely sUbjective basis . The 
researchers cannot divorce their own norms and beliefs from their 
work . This shortcoming inevitably manifests itself in their work. 
Western analysts enter research with a world-view based on a 
particular system of beliefs and cultures. The same applies to 
core and periphery analysis. Kegley's analysis asserts that a 
procedural decision regime exists in the decision-making process. 
In some cases, this is impossible for even though there may exist 
consensus about the ends or goals of a policy, there may be 
numerous procedures or means available to achieve those ends. 
Agreement may never arise even though coalitions form and 
negotiation occurs. The world-views of the decision-makers may 
be too divergent in which case a pure procedural decision regime 
will not arise. He does not make allowance for this peculiarity. 
Another bone of contention arises with the levels of influence 
different external and domestic actors exert. The international 
community does not wield the same level of pressure in all 
states . In the authoritarian regime, the international pressure 
groups are largely negated due to the centralisation of the 
decision-makers and the fact that a great measure of power is 
used in order to regulate the domestic environment. Contrary to 
Kegley's assertions (Kegley in Hermann et al:1987:253/254), 
policy-makers do not as a rule choose "less than optimal foreign 
policy options", neither do they often "act on principle", nor 
do they "resist the temptation to make decisions arbitrarily". 
This applies especially to regimes that do not rely on public 
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approval. If the regime is imposed, it tends to ignore the 
majority of its populace's d i ssatisfaction with is actions. 
Figure 2.1: Kegley's 
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Source: Hermann et al New Directions i n the Study of Foreign 
Policy Allen and Unwin, Boston,1987, page 265. 
Hagan's analysis of regimes, and the forces affecting them, also 
has a number of shortcomings. He does not examine the nature of 
regime changes effectively. Each factor has been proposed as an 
individual source of change (Hagan i n Hermann et al : 1987:347-
348) . In reality, however, there are usually a number of reasons 
for changes in regime make-up. There may be a change in the 
leadership altering the coalition construction in the government 
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eventually leading to a complete regime change via a coup d'etat 
due to public and military opposition. His four basic sets of 
actors affecting regimes (as mentioned above), in addition to 
shedding light on how they affect foreign policies, expose the 
fact that knowledge of a regime's internal strengths could inform 
researchers of the leadership's ability to withstand the 
pressures of actors outside the regime whether they be interest 
groups inside or outside the borders of the country. Therefore, 
in certain regimes, the presence of these vulnerabilities and 
levels of fragmentation could promote aggressive rather than 
conciliatory policies. In the face of crisis, certain policy-
makers may opt for more power-orientated decisions by virtue of 
perceived threats, their tenuous legitimacy and their need to 
remain in power. 
In the light of these criticisms of both Charles Kegley and Joe 
Hagan's regime analysis, this author wishes to propose a revised 
diagram which applies to the specific area of study addressed by 
this paper. The diagram takes into cognisance the criticisms 
discussed above, and attempts to formulate new ideas on regime 
analysis. 
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The regionalist attributes of certain countries may be 
particularly strong in that they are part of a regional bloc and 
cannot be studied out of that context due to the close, mutually 
influencing relationships within the bloc. The global attributes 
are not as effective as Kegley proposes and therefore the 
feedback from this dimension is not as strongly depicted as that 
from regional and national attributes. All these factors have 
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input on the procedural decision regimes. Note the plural has 
been used due to the argument that consensus may never be 
reached. However, at various stages, 
different coalitions may form but 
and on specific issues, 
revert to their former 
composition as soon as the issue has been solved. The only aspect 
which remains unchallenged is the substantive decision regime. 
Consensus about the aims of policy exists in the majority of 
regimes regardless of the contrasting methods being used . At 
various stages of decision-making, there is also input from the 
procedural regimes. The dominant party or group in anyone 
coalition always has an effect on the aims of the policy. In 
periods of crisis the military will project policy-options which 
espouse a world-view of a regional power in terms of military 
strength and security. This perspective in turn will affect the 
economic, social and political relationships within that region 
thereby affecting policy content. 
The most important questions which need to be raised in the 
context of this paper pertain to the applicability of the 
decision regime theory to the Namibian-South African relationship 
during the Botha era. Did a decision regime exist during Botha's 
rule and, if so, did it comply with the regime analysis offerred 
in this chapter? Did P.W Botha's character directly affect the 
policies that emerged during the decade prior to Namibia's 
indpendence and, if so, in what way? What kind of policy emerged 
during the period 1978 - 1989 by virtue of the crisis situation 
and the domination of the military in the decision-making 
process? Did the ends that the South African government set for 
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itself justify the means both domestically and in Namibia? Which 
pressure groups played significant roles in changing the regime 
in Namibia and creating a policy of reform in the 1980s? If the 
pressure groups and other factors influenced decision making 
during this period, how did they achieve it? 
An attempt to answer these questions will be made in the 
following chapters. South Africa's domination of Namibia is 
unique in that Botha's policy was pursued adamantly despite mass 
opposition from the international community, from communities in 
South Africa itself and in Namibia,of course. In Wilkenfeld and 
associates' words, an analysis of "who does what to whom, where, 
when and in what immediate context" (1980:36) will be the basis 
of this paper. 
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CHAPTER THREE REGIME ANALYSIS AND BOTHA'S NAMIBIAN POLICY 
This chapter deals with the application of the regime theory 
to South Africa's foreign policy making process with specific 
reference to Namibia's independence process. An analysis of PW 
Botha's character presents insight into why certain policies were 
chosen during his term of office. This writer argues that Botha' s 
policy-making forums did constitute decision-making regimes. 
These changed in composition according to the issues but did not 
change the objectives the South African government held for the 
Namibian issue . The proposed internal settlements and the policy 
of destabilisation comply with the concept of procedural decision 
regimes . Finally, the chapter examines the South African regional 
policy based on the carrot and stick approach which underlined 
Botha's regional relations with the Frontline States of 
Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. Namibia was also subjected to 
this combination of incentives and disincentives in order to 
achieve a favourable outcome for the South African Botha regime . 
Colin Legum suggests that South Africa has four main elements in 
its strategy for survival. The first deals with maintaining 
political control domestically, the second is to create a stable 
environment for continued economic growth, the third is to build 
a defense system strong enough to withstand any attacks, and 
finally South Africa aims to improve its relations with the rest 
of Africa as a means of gaining Western approval, countering 
Soviet expansion and creating a greater African market for its 
goods (Price and Rotberg : 1980 : 283-284). Barber and Barratt, in 
their book entitled South Africa's Foreign Policy - The Search 
43 
for Status and Security 1945 - 1988 (1990), state that the study 
of foreign policy 
"focuses attention on the government, and 
in particular the executive - its aims, its 
resources, how it employed those resources, the 
pressures on it at home and abroad, who made the 
decisions on what basis"(Barber and Barratt:1990:1). 
The objectives the South African government chose were firstly, 
to be a regional leader, and secondly, to maintain white 
domination at all costs. The objectives were styled 
into policies based on repression and aggression both within 
South Africa and the region. Even though the policies may have 
changed in degree, they had not altered in essence by the end of 
the 1980s. The foreign policy of South Africa was based on the 
ends and means theory which allowed for different methods to be 
used in order to achieve their objectives. 
The premiership of Pieter Willem Botha created a scenario that 
was new to the average South African. with it, argues Rotberg, 
came the realisation of "South Africa's weakened internal and 
world position and a calculated assessment that mere stonewalling 
offers no solution" (Foreign Policy No38: 1980: 132). Not only was 
he a military man, but he also believed that big business could 
play an important role in policy-making. Up to this point, 
Vorster had left policy formulation to various committees and had 
acted simply as a "chairman of the board". When Botha took over 
the reins, he restructured the decision-making body of the 
government, rationalised the State Security Council and gave it 
more power to make decisions without the need to consult or 
inform parliament. He afforded the incumbent of the premiership 
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more powers and revitalised the civil service (Leadership 
VoI4/No2:1985:38) . This was to form the basis of his National 
Security Management System. 
P. W Botha had been a National Party official since 1953 and 
worked himself up through the ranks of the party machine to the 
powerful position he held when he siezed the premiership. He had 
been known for his "organisational skills, perseverence, party 
loyalty and ruthlessness" (International Affairs Bulletin 
VoI13/N03: 1989: 74). In an article entitled "The Operational Code 
of PW Botha: Apartheid ,realism and misperception" Van Wyk and 
Van Nieuwkerk posit an interesting analysis of Botha's 
psychological make-up and relate this to the foreign policies 
which emerged during his rule. They attribute Botha's policies 
to his operational codes and typify him as having a B-type 
belief system. Realist policies characterise B-type belief 
systems because these policy-makers view reality as being 
competitive and aggressive. The policy-makers believe that humans 
are inherently violent and therefore need to be controlled by 
means of aggressive policies. The policy-makers attempt to 
acquire as much power as possible in order to protect their 
societies because of their obsession with survival. 
Misperceptions are also common to the B-type belief system. 
"Botha's 'Cold War' world view, combined with 
'Total Onslaught' rhetoric, gave rise to a 
foreign policy based on realist assumptions, and 
conducted with vigour by the South African state. 
These assumptions include: strength produces peace, 
might yields influence, superior firepower can 
both deter and compete, power can be puchased, 
the capacity to destroy is the capacity to 
control, and political problems are susceptible 
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to military solutions" (International Affairs Bulletin 
Vo113/No 3:1989:70-86) . 
Arising from this is a view that threats eminate from all 
quarters of political life. Botha's Total National Strategy was 
based on the idea that communists had a vested interest in South 
Africa. He believed that communists would stop at nothing to 
overthrow the white regimes frustrating their evil designs. When 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola achieved independence, his fears 
were reinforced . 
Botha's links with the military sector afforded him a "managerial 
attitude to the structures of central government", especially the 
bureaucracy (Political Studies xxxvii : 1989:67). He engaged the 
captains of the South African economy directly by encouraging 
South Africa's armaments and other key industries . The first 
important conference between business and the government was held 
at the Carlton Hotel in Joha,nnesburg in 1979 where he attempted 
to involve them in his policy-making. Barber and Barratt report 
that "subsequently many of them (business leaders) complained 
about the meagre results of the Conference and what they saw as 
Botha's attempt to co-opt them to his side" (1990:258) . Despite 
this hindsight, at the time the leaders in the economic sphere 
were honoured to be part of a process which had previously been 
denied to them by the Vorster regime. Botha's regime was 
therefore made up of military specialists and leaders in big 
business. This granted him the opportunity to formulate various 
policies at different stages in South African politics . 
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The period of Botha's takeover was also noted for intense worker 
and student militancy against white rule. The liberation 
movements increased their attacks on civilian targets and were 
much stronger because of the ideological and military support 
they received from the Frontline States and the communist bloc. 
SWAPO also increased its attacks on civilian targets and South 
African Defence Force bases due to its strengthened position from 
its Frontline bases. As a result of these events, states 
Chrisopher Coker, the South African Defence Force was transformed 
into 
"a powerful arm of the state. In part the 
change was prompted by the belief that the 
West no longer considered the Republic a 
useful ally; America's failure to come to 
South Africa's assistance in Angola convinced 
her that it was no longer in her interests to 
act as a member in all but name of the Western 
Alliance" (Survival March/April: 1983:59) • 
The policies of Botha were governed by the concept of a Total 
National Strategy developed as a response to the increased 
onslaught on the South African state. Initially it had been a 
response to a Red (communist) threat but after the increase in 
black opposition, it became a response to a black threat. An 
organic crisis existed in the National Party and in the South 
African government. The Total National Strategy entailed four 
reforms which were "streamlining apartheid, strengthening the 
military, supporting business and bringing it into partnership, 
and creating a new regional policy" (Hanlon:1986:13). 
The National Party was faced with demands for a new dispensation 
for the black majority from the South African capitalist class, 
the domestic black majority as well as international pressure 
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groups. Davies and 0' Meara state that these policies "were 
produced out of deep political conflict within the ruling class 
and the consolidation under P . W Botha of a new political 
alignment of class force" (Review of Afican Political Economy 
No29:1984:68). The 1977 Defence White Paper states that total 
strategy 
"is the comprehensive plan to utilise 
all the means available to a state according to 
an integrated pattern in order to achieve the 
national aims within the framework of the specific 
policies" (1977:5). 
The Total National Strategy was directed at all aspects of the 
political, economic and social spheres of South Africa. The 
policy was formulated by the State Security Council . The SSC was 
dominated by the military and included a few leading civil 
servants. 
"Although government spokesmen maintained -
correctly in a de jure sense - that the SSC, 
like other Cabinet Committees, had no executive 
authority and that its recommendations were 
subject to Cabinet approval, there were grey 
areas involving sensitve security, intelligence 
and foreign policy matters, where the SSC in 
practice was effectively the decision-making body" 
(Barber and Barratt:1990:253). 
Chaired by the Prime Minister, it headed the National Security 
Management System which "provided the basis for legitimising the 
increasing military involvement in all spheres of strategic 
decion-making, coordinated through the state security council" 
(Work in Progress 56/57:1988:22). Every means available to the 
South African government would henceforth be employed at all 
levels of society in order to effect the changes which were 
needed to maintain South Africa's position as a regional power. 
These means included the use of security forces within and 
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without South Africa's borders, the use of political reform to 
co-opt various sectors of the population and finally to upgrade 
the living conditions of the ' African' community. The National 
Party displayed a remarkable convergence of interests in the 
early years of Botha's rule. Glenn Moss states that 
"in responding to these changing 
dynamics (increased opposition from blacks 
and dissatisfaction among white voters) 
these two 'groups' - military power and 
organised capitalist interests - found that 
their new interests were converging: a total 
strategy was being formed" (Work in Progress 11: 1980: 1) • 
A substantive decision regime emerged as a result of the unity 
on goals. 
In a Weekly Mail article (October 3-8: 1986), Anton Harber 
correctly states that the security system "has an extraordinary 
ability to go around normal departmental procedures and ensure 
that its recommendations are decided on at the highest level". 
The State Security Council had been given greater powers with 
Botha's ascent to power and now formed the eminent decision-
making body in the South African government . The Star (5/8/1983) 
reported that the SSC 
"are military pragmatists, guided by the central 
principle of Afrikaner survival, that no concession 
should be made to an enemy until absolutely 
necessary" . 
The article argues that the members of the SSC are not 'hawks' 
but are "military pragmatists". The general understanding of 
military personnel was that they were hawkish in orientation, 
preferring military solutions to political problems. Garth 
Sheldon, however, states that the division between the military 
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hawks, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information 
(DFAI) existed only on the means employed, not on the objectives . 
"Therefore if one insists on bird imagery 
it would be more accurate to describe 
the inhabitants of the competing foreign policy 
nests as eagles (military) and hawks (DFAI) for 
the difference is one of degree rather than kind" 
(Politikon Vo113/No1:1986:9). 
Botha's militarist tendencies were made obvious by his dismissal 
of Vorster' s detente initiatives. "PW Botha and the military 
establishment were sceptical of the co-operative approach 
advocated by Hilgard Muller and adopted by Vorster" (Barber and 
Barratt:1990:181). Ivor Sarakinsky, however, reports that 
according to Mark Swilling, reformists were dominant in the 
policy-making sector prior to 1986 (Work in Progress 52: 1988: 47) • 
This is not entirely correct as the destabilisation policies of 
the South African state were very evident until 1982. Diplomatic 
initiatives took the place of destabilisation policies until 
1986 . In spite of this, South Africa covertly supported dissident 
armies in the Frontline States in order to counter the perceived 
threat from outside its border (Cammack in Moss and 
Obery:1990:194) . In 1983, the era of the new constitution and the 
Tricameral Parliament arrived. Reform occurred as a result of an 
escalation in internal and international pressures. In accordance 
with its carrot and stick policies, South Africa increased its 
regional military attacks at the same time. The visit by the 
Eminent Person's Group in 1986 coincided with a complex programme 
of destabilisation against Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
resulting in mass opposition. South Africa seemed to balk at the 
idea of external control and prescription from the international 
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community on the Namibian, Angolan and domestic issues. 1986 
signalled the end of the reform era and the start of a series of 
State of Emergencies directed at the internal crises. 
Sheldon'S article "Theoretical Perspectives on South African 
Foreign Policy Making" (Politikon VoI13/No1:1986:6-11) asserts 
that foreign policy formulation is characterised by competition 
and conflict between the civil and military intelligence 
establishments. The Foreign Affairs Department and the State 
Security Council often chose divergent solutions to the same 
problem. Departmental disagreement, he says, does not necessarily 
imply that the party in the majority will dominate the policy-
making process. "Thus an SADF majority in the Secretariat (of the 
SSC) is more likely to produce interdepartmental antagonism and 
conflict than to ensure SADF control of foreign policy" 
(Politikon Vo1l3/No1:1986:7) because of the ability of the 
foreign minister to bypass inferior committees and address the 
State Security Council directly. 
There is evidence of Kegley's substantive decision-making regime 
in Botha's era in that the objectives were common among all the 
parties and were based on a world-view premised on white 
domination and regional control. The procedural decision-making 
regime presents a greater problem in the process of analysis. The 
hawks and the doves formed different procedural blocs, each one 
favouring a specific method of solving problems. Contrary to 
Tjonneland, who argues that .. such competition and confusion 
reveal severe contraditions at the level of policy objectives" 
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(Discussion Paper 2:1989:26), the South African decision-makers 
shared the same objectives. The hawks chose military options as 
is evident by the various incursions into the Frontline States 
starting in 1975. These attacks occurred simultaneously with the 
doves' attempts at forging co-operative relationships between the 
Frontline States and South Africa. 
The Constellation of Southern African States attempt had been 
initiated by Vorster but did not achieve any success even after 
Botha's rise to power. The Frontline States refused to deal with 
the '~ndependent homelands' in South Africa and did not wish to 
become dependent on the latter nation. The idea was finally laid 
to rest when the newly independent states chose to form the 
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference in 1980. 
As a result of their defiance, South Africa increased its 
military attacks on these nations. The increase in black domestic 
opposition was also an incentive for these attacks because the 
African National Congress was reported to have bases in these 
Frontline States. Raids increased tremendously in the period 1977 
to 1980. This was the period of negotiation for Namibia's 
independence settlement. South Africa continued to attend talks 
despite the opposition to their military programme in the region. 
Destabilisation occurred simultaneously with the offers of 
peaceful solutions to regional problems. Accords and treaties 
were offerred to the Frontline States. "It's (destabilisation) 
primary goal can be seen as the collapse of radical anti-south 
African governments and their replacement by regimes that are 
clients of Pretoria" (Price in Chan 1990:155). The Frontline 
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states managed to maintain their Marxist-Leninist ideologies 
despite South African domination on the economic, social and 
political fronts. 
This two pronged approach characterised Botha's foreign policy 
towards Namibia in the 1978-1989 period. Julie Frederickse's 
article in Africa News (7 July 1980:6) exposes this plan as one 
in which the Botha government wanted to "weaken SWAPO and build 
up South African/DTA alliances". DTA remained South Africa's 
designated party until the independence of Namibia. Africa 
Confidential also carried an article titled "Namibia: The Last 
Charade" (VoI24/No6:1983) in which it was reported that South 
Africa wished to weaken the MPLA and build a 'multi-racial' party 
in Namibia as a prelude to eventual internal elections. South 
Africa and the DTA hoped that SWAPO would be disqualified from 
such elections on the grounds that it did not constitute an 
organised political party. At this stage, South Africa engaged 
SWAPO in low-intensity warfare which amounted to basically terror 
tactics by the SADF, the South West African Police, the South 
West African Territory Force and Koevoet . The latter force was 
established in 1978 as a means to counter SWAPO in the 
operational area. Their targets were mostly the civilians who 
harboured supporters of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia 
in their villages (Work in Progress 29:1983:5). This constant 
conflict situation made it impossible for the liberation movement 
to become a legal political party. 
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The decision to support the DTA was not the only the South 
African regime made. Problems emerged in the DTA after the 
resignation of Kalagula and the withdrawal of Ovambo support 
giving "Pretoria the perfect opportunity to call for the 
formation of an interim govenment that would be 'more effective 
and more representative '" (Cullinan in Moss and Obery:1990:33) . 
Cullinan continues by stating that "the responsibility of 
reorganising the interim government was given to senior military 
advisers" (Moss and Obery:1990:33) . By the end of 1982 , the DTA 
temporarily disbanded in an attempt to gain credibility at this 
late stage in the negotiations process . 
During 1983, the South African government attempted to form an 
anti-SWAPO coalition in the Multi-Party Conference. Disagreements 
in the Conference stalled Botha's attempts to form an internal 
government (Barber and Barratt:1990:283). The MPC shouldered the 
responsibility of drawing up a new constitution in Namibia. 
Forming an interim government was one of its aims. The MPC was 
not as widely accepted as had been hoped and was criticised for 
being "a farce and a body with no intention of hastening 
independence" (Weaver in Moss and Obery : 1990:213). The South 
African government had backed this conference hoping that it 
would offer an alternative to SWAPO . This in effect stalled the 
UN Resolution 435 process as the MPC contravened the agreement 
that a constitution would only be drawn up by a post-independence 
body . The MPC lost even more of its limited credibility when 
Pretoria gave "full governing powers (short of Defence and 
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Foreign Affairs) to the MPC's 'transitional government of 
national unity'" (Du Preez in Moss and Obery:1990:347). 
Judge Hiemstra, the head of the Constitutional Council, stated 
that the TGNU established the Council in order ,,'to work out a 
basis on which the territory can exist as an independent and 
sovereign state'" (Leistner and Esterhuysen:1991:81). This was 
an attempt to produce an independent structure which would 
hopefully meet with the approval of the UN and the Western 
Contact Group. Firstly, it was different to the Turnhalle 
arrangement in that it included SWAPO as an important body (even 
though SWAPO declined to participate in the Council). Secondly, 
political parties were represented rather than specific ethnic 
groupings. Finally, unlike the Turnha11e Conference, the TGNU did 
not discuss policy issues: their main emphasis was on 
constitutional matters and governmental functioning (Hiemstra in 
Leistner and Esterhuysen:1991:81-82). In spite of the more 
acceptable structure of the TGNU, Namibia was not truly 
independent. All the structures that Botha had established in 
Namibia were still supported by South Africa and did not comply 
with the regulations of Resolution 435. The international 
community was not prepared to accept any compromise the South 
African government might orchestrate. The TGNU continued to 
operate until its dissolution in April 1989 in preparation for 
the independence process which was to take place at the end of 
the same year. 
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South Africa's foreign policy towards Namibia was characterised 
by its two-pronged approach. The decision-making regimes did not 
remain static but changed composition to suit the issue at hand. 
There was no significant change in policy even though the choices 
vacillated between military and diplomatic. As Sheldon states 
"often no clear outcome (of the competition) 
is evident 
thus policy is charcterised by a 'gyroscopic 
effect' promoting the continuance of policy 
options originally agreed to, despite changing 
circumstances. (South Africa;s policy on Namibia 
certainly falls within this category). This 
condition is related to the need for consensus" 
(Politikon VoI13/Nol:1986:9). 
What became apparent was the tendency of the South African 
government to become, on the one hand, more militarily aggressive 
in the event of a crisis, and on the other, to resort to 
diplomatic tactics that were certain to gain international 
acceptance, to alleviate pressure from the region and to appease 
its voters and black middle class in South Africa. Davies and 
O'Meara state that "'destabilisation' had never been a first 
option of Pretoria ••• particular emphasis on such 'disincentive' 
tactics has specifically emerged in periods of defeat/crisis for 
the broader strategy of the apartheid regime" (Journal of 
Southern African Studies Volll/N02:1985:1985). The South African 
creation of the DTA, the Constituent Assembly, the MPC and 
finally the TGNU evidently support this assertion. They chose to 
engage every other party except SWAPO in the process of reform 
and attempted to discredit the liberation movement. This was done 
by pointing out to moderate Namibians that even though SWAPO was 
not prepared to negotiate for independence, the South African 
56 
government was willing to compromise and grant independence to 
the former mandated territory. 
On the domestic front, in 1982 the National Party once again 
experienced rightwing opposition to its latest reform proposals. 
The Conservative Party, formed by Andries Treurnicht, was a 
breakaway rightwing group from the National Party. In spite of 
this vote of no confidence, the National Party continued its 
reform policies by drawing up a new constitution in 1983. A 
nationwide referendum proved that white South Africans were 
willing to open up their ranks to the 'coloured' and 'Indian' 
sectors of the community. The 'Africans' were excluded from this 
new dispensation. 
Internally, there was evidence of polarisation between the 
'hawks' and the 'doves'. The hawks propagated domestic policies 
which were based on aggressive repression by means of the states 
of emergency which were renewed for three consecutive years, 
detention without trial, banning of organisations and the 
presence of the military in the townships. The 'doves', on the 
other hand, proposed constitutional reform in order to maintain 
capital growth as an alternative to the maintainance of the 
destructive white-ruled regime. The 1984 Tricameral elections 
introduced a new era in South African politics and also renewed 
the military's attempts to eliminate the opposition's rejection 
of this parliament by the black majority of South Africa. What 
followed therefore were domestic policies that were similar to 
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the content of the foreign policies: incentives and 
disincentives. 
The two decision regimes were convergent in terms of their 
objectives for the region but were divergent in their attempts 
to formulate policies which would succeed. The procedural regimes 
did not affect the substantive decision regime in any way. They 
could be seen as entirely separate entities, each being affected 
by the various pressure sources. The procedural decision regimes 
existed as parallel decision-making blocs. The inputs from the 
various pressure groups had different effects on these blocs. The 
increased pressure on the reformist bloc resulted in the 1988 
Municipal elections, the Transitional Government of National 
unity and finally Namibian independence. Locally the statist bloc 
responded with heightened repression and a regionally, they 
increased their destabilising activities. 
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CHAPTER FOUR SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND NAMIBIAN 
INDEPENDENCE 
This chapter deals with the process of negotiation for Namibia's 
independence. First of all, the world-view of the policy-makers 
is analysed as this throws light on the actions undertaken by the 
regime during the period this study. It examines the various 
sources of pressure which eventually effected change in Namibia. 
A discussion of the changing world system is also included 
because it had major implications for peace in the Southern 
African region. In addition to an analysis of the UN's role, the 
Western Contact Group's participation in the negotiations will 
be examined. Figure 2.1 forms a diagrammatic characterisation of 
this chapter. The inputs will be the main focus of this stage of 
the paper. Finally, the reasons for South Africa's decision to 
grant Namibia total independence will also be discussed. 
A document of the World Council of Churches explains that South 
Africa would not accept Resolution 435 passively because of 
Namibia'S position as a "buffer state" between Marxist-Leninist 
Southern Africa and white-ruled capitalist South Africa. South 
Africa opposed SWAPO rule at all costs because the liberation 
movement's victory in Namibia would encourage the liberation 
movements in South Africa to believe that they too could achieve 
black rule in this country (1988:26-27). Namibia was under the 
complete control of the republic. South Africa 
"owns the rail-transport system, the airline, 
the entire communications network and the only 
viable port (Walvis Bay); it supplies the 
territory's oil, and coal, most civil servants 
are South Africans and could be withdrawn; 
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Namibia is knitted into the Rand Monetary Area 
and the South African Customs Union; and, until 
independence, there will probably be no exchange 
control " (Watts in Rotberg:1983:111). 
Namibia also played a major role in attracting de stabilisation 
to the rest of Southern Africa, especially Angola. SADF bases in 
the Caprivi Strip and in the north were more effective at 
repelling SWAPO and were also close enough to support the UNITA 
forces in conflict situations with the MPLA (PCR 
information : l988:28-30). 
Effective methods were needed to remove the South African regime 
from Namibia . There were three main sectors who rallied for 
change. These were the international community, the Frontline 
States and the domestic opposition groups. Kurt von Schirnding 
correctly stated that "(i)nternational pressure can never play 
a decisive role in South Africa . But it has the potential to do 
great harm" 
(South Africa International Vol20/No2:1989:100). 
The relationship between South Africa and the international 
communi ty during the Botha era took on any of three forms. 
Firstly, some nations isolated South Africa completely, secondly, 
a number penetrated her economy and thirdly, the remaining 
nations intervened. with the growing interdependence of members 
of the internatioanl community, involvement in countries by their 
neighbours becomes more common. This occurs to such an extent 
that if a crisis arises within one country, it normally has a 
profound effect on the other countries in its immediate region . 
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The further apart the countri es are, the less impact they have 
on one another . This holds true for countries which do not have 
legitimacy problems therefore present a united front to any 
aggressor . South Africa does not escape from international 
currents despite its pariah status. International intervention 
escalated during the Botha era as a result of the South African 
regime's vulnerability. 
South Africa did not enjoy links with many of the European 
nations due to the sanctions imposed by the UN in 1986. The most 
important relationships South Africa had were with the United 
States of America and Britain due to historical ties with these 
two countries. 
During the era of the Cold War between the Eastern and the 
Western blocs, South Africa believed that it had a duty to 
perform in Southern Africa. This entailed the protection of 
western capitalist ideals in the face of a communist onslaught. 
John de St Jorre supports this by saying 
"(t)he South Africans insist that Soviet 
imperialism is entering a dangerously 
aggressive phase in Africa, and they urge 
that the Western alliance support the 
republic as the most effective bulwark 
against communism" (Foreign Policy No28: 1977 : 85) • 
South Africa had seen itself as an integral and critical part of 
the Western security system. The cancelled Simonstown Agreement 
proved this notion to be a gross misconception. As if to drum 
this in, the British Navy did not have any use for the naval 
station during the Falklands' war in the early eighties. The 
presence of stategic minerals and raw materials in South Africa 
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also fed the misconception that the US would wish to enter into 
bilateral agreements with this country. 
Prior to Botha' s rule, American policy was based on human rights. 
The Carter Administration propogated the isolationist path. 
However, change came about in 1981 when Republican Ronald Reagan 
became president . The US policy towards South Africa then became 
Crocker's policy of constructive engagement. The Reagan 
Administration's poli cy was meant to "encourage change in the 
apartheid system through a quiet dialogue with that country's 
white minority" (Ungar and Vale:1985:235). This was demonstrated 
in US handling of both the Namibian and the apartheid questions. 
The US identified the presence of Cuban troops in Angola as an 
obstacle in the path to Namibian independence. They wanted to 
link South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia with the withdrawal 
of all foreign (meaning Cuban) powers from the region. The hope 
was that this linkage would bring about a communist-free Southern 
Africa simultaneously with Namibian independence. This did not 
have the desired effect for "paradoxically, the Cubans probably 
became still more entrenched in Angola because of the 
reverberations from the linkage proposal" (Carter:1985:35). 
Other members of the Western Contact Group opposed the linkage 
of the Angolan and Namibian issues . Jaster identified this 
opposition as the main factor which led to the end of the 
combined Western initiated talks and the start of a primarily US 
diplomatic venture after 1982 (1990:13). The US did not withdraw 
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from South Africa willingly when the UN called for mandatory 
sanctions in 1986. They handed over many of their companies to 
South African management under different names. This was merely 
a change of facade rather than a complete withdrawal of US 
capital. The 1984 Tricameral parliament also met with US approval 
as this system broadened the capitalist base of the country and 
was preferable to a black-ruled state. The one significant 
success story of US policy was the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid 
Act of 1986. "Inter alia this forbade the import of South African 
coal, iron, steel, uranium, arms and ammunition, textiles and 
agricultural products" (Barber and Barratt:1990:333) . This Act 
placed immediate pressure on the South African government because 
it struck at the heart of the South African economy. The American 
influence in changing South African policies was not very 
effective. However, one cannot ignore the 'success' of their 
punitive sanctions, for with the additional internal pressure, 
change came about in the late 1980s. 
The British policy toward South Africa was also an exception to 
the international rule of isolation. For many reasons they were 
reluctant to sever ties with South Africa. Britain had been the 
colonial power in South Africa until 1961. Britain did accept the 
arms embargo against South Africa in 1977 but, with the advent 
of the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher in 1980, their 
politics moved to the far right of the political spectrum. with 
great reluctance the UK went along with a limited sanctions 
package with loopholes in order not to be isolated from the rest 
of the Commonwealth and the European Economic Community. 
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"The British government has persistently 
and strenuously opposed the imposition of 
sanctions against South Africa 
on the grounds that it would be a punitive 
measure that would hurt blacks more than 
whites in South Africa" (Aluko:1989:60). 
In a very controversial article, Austin presents six reasons for 
Britain's reluctance to disengage itself from South Africa. Among 
these is the arguments that there is still time "for change to 
prevent revolution and for reform to avert disaster" 
(International Affairs Vo162/No3:1986:393). Britain could never 
have singlehandely created conditions to ensure change in South 
Africa nor in Namibia. Hedley Bull's argument supports this by 
stating that Anglo-American policies are due to their view that 
"a policy of complete disinvestment would 
imply severance of serving diplomatic and 
economic links, and would lead to total 
isolation of South Africa except for links 
it may have with other pariah states" 
(International Affairs Bulletin Vo12/No2:1978:11). 
Ultimately, South Africa only benefitted from these policies in 
terms of prolonging the inevitable independence of Namibia and 
delaying change in its own domestic sector. 
The Namibian issue generated massive international response. As 
early as 1946 the UN formulated policy on the issue of South 
Africa's illegal occupation of the territory. By the time PW 
Botha came into power in 1978, the UN's struggle had spanned more 
than three decades and had employed various strategies such as 
economic sanctions, an arms embargo, ostracisation and public 
condemnation of the South African policies of apartheid. In spite 
of its valiant attempts, the UN could not have achieved its goals 
without initial backing of the Western Contact Group and the 
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continued us actions in the field. Du Pisani reports that the UN 
initiatives failed as early as 1981 when the Geneva Conference 
was aborted. This marked the collapse of the UN transition plan 
(Politikon VoI8/No1:1981:14). The UN's lack of success was also 
due to South Africa's defiance of the UN proposals because of 
this nation's exclusion from the international organisation. The 
effectiveness of UN was limited by Article 2 (7) of its own 
Charter. South Africa invoked this article in order to prevent 
intervention from the international organisation 
(Bennett: 1977: 401). It was only when the situation threatened the 
peace and sovereignty of other nations that the UN was empowered 
to act effectively. 
The main thrust of the international pressure came from the 
Western Contact Group which had been established by the US, UK, 
France, West Germany and Canada in 1977. 
"The protracted negotiations about Namibia 
between the Contact Group of five and South 
Africa have been a splendid device for 
harmonising the pursuit of the major powers' 
interests in Southern Africa" (Hill in Carter and 
O'Meara:1982:109). 
Resolution 435 was agreed upon as a result of negotiations 
between the Contact Group, South Africa and Namibia. Despite 
failure at various points in the negotiation process, the Contact 
Group managed to guide the parties to an agreement. The linkage 
issue not only counted in the favour of the US but it also gave 
South Africa incentive to conclude the Namibian issue. The 
removal of the communist threat had been a fixation of the South 
African policies since the start of the Botha era. 
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Throughout the negotiation process South Africa waged war against 
SWAPO and its bases in the Frontline States. It also held second 
tier elections in 1980 in an attempt to lend the DTA more 
credibility. These 'two-track' policies occurred parallel to the 
Western Contact Group's efforts to produce peaceful change. 
"On the international track, South 
Africa has been offered a formula that could 
bring international legitimacy to an independent 
government willing to protect South African 
interests - the DTA or possibly some other 
combination that would deny SWAPO a winner-take-all 
victory. On the internal track, the DTA has been 
strengthened and given more and more governing 
powers leading to an internal settlement short of 
UDI" (Rocha:1983:142). 
The Western Contact Group continued to pressurise South Africa 
into accepting the UN proposed settlement. South Africa continued 
to attend the talks but also set up internal structures that 
threatened the UN's proposals. An interim government was set up 
in 1985 and later became the transitional government of national 
unity. In 1986, however, South Africa threatened the negotiations 
by expelling the Eminent Persons' Group from inside its borders. 
This did not result in Western Contact Group cancelling its 
involvement in the negotiation process: indeed, it enhanced their 
role. 
The regional pressure group consisted of the Frontline States and 
SWAPO. Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe pressed SWAPO into 
attending the negotiations because of the pressure South Africa 
was applying to them. The policy of destabilisation had ruined 
their economies and infrastructures. The presence of both the US 
and the Soviet Union in the region had grave implications for 
these states. Southern Africa had become another arena for the 
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Cold War. SWAPO's role in coercing South Africa took the form 
of guerrilla attacks on SADF bases and rallying Namibian 
opposi tion against South African rule. Armed contacts between the 
SADF and SWAPO increased dramatically after 1986 (Wood cited in 
Herbstein and Evenson:1991:171). The churches, youth and other 
civic organisations played a major role in bringing the South 
African regime to a non-negotiable settlement under Resolution 
435. The /Ai-//Gams Conference, convened by the Namibian Council 
of Churches in 1986, proved that opposition to South African rule 
permeated all sectors of the Namibian life. 
Just as 1975 had been a watershed year for South African 
politics, so was 1988 for regional relations. All the while that 
South Africa was engaged in negotiations it had a final card up 
its proverbial sleeve. The military attacks increased against 
SWAPO bases in Angola under the pretexts of protecting the border 
region and the Caleque dam. In the South African Defence Force 
magazine, Paratus, the commander of the 1987/1988 operations into 
southern Angola admitted that it had never been South Africa's 
intention to capture the town of Cuito Cuanavale (March 1988: 14) • 
This may have been the military's brief to the press but what 
actually happened was that heavy fighting lasted for days in the 
town between the SADF-UNITA forces and the MPLA-Cuban forces. 
Reporter Jeffrey Herbst from Die suid-Afrikaan commented that 
"Fidel Castro het 'n klassieke 'chicken'-spel 
met die SAW begin met as doelwit om die 
Suid-Afrikaanse opmars te stuit, die Angolese 
magte uit hul penarie te red, en die militere 
magsbalans in Suidelike Afrika te verander" 
(No19 Febuary 1989:25). 
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The SADF's Achilles heel had finally been discovered. The same 
forces which for years had reduced the region to a dependent 
conglomeration of states, withdrew ignomiously. The war in Angola 
had escalated as South Africa protected its rebel UNITA army from 
the MPLA forces. The more the UNITA forces were threatened by 
MPLA and Cuban attacks, the more South Africa and the US 
supported Savimbi' s army. The war dragged on for such an extended 
period that in January 1988 South Africa had difficulty in 
keeping up the same level of attack as it had done the previous 
year. In an attempt to regain the initiative and win MPLA areas, 
UNITA redirected its attacks in the south east section of Angola 
(Southern Africa Dossier:October 1988:3). 
The attack did not achieve what it had set out to do: the town 
of Cuito Cuanavale did not fall, neither did UNITA win any new 
areas in Angola. Even though the combined Cuban and MPLA forces 
managed to gain the upperhand in the war as a result of their 
superior military power, there was no outright victory. The 
Angolan forces had sustained heavy artillery attacks on the town 
and lost a number of lives. Similarly, the South African 
government had lost the white voters' support for the border war. 
They had also been militarily crippled by the economic and arms 
sanctions imposed by the international community. As a result of 
this isolation, the arms used by the SADF did not compete 
favourably with the Soviet produced MIG-23/Su-22 fighters. 
Another factor leading to the withdrawal of South African troops 
was the very real possibility of losing more lives than the SADF 
could afford. "As young white boys started coming home from 
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Angola in body bags, many whites began to doubt the wisdom of the 
war" (New Era Vo13/N03:1988:5). This promoted the formation of 
anti-conscription campaigns and an increase in the number of 
conscientious objectors. 
The end of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale heralded the return to 
the settlement proposed by Resolution 435. Brendan Seery comments 
that South Africa and SWAPO entered into a "'gentlemen's 
agreement' which led to a de facto ceasefire coming into effect 
in northern Nambia on 1 September" (Moss and Obery:1990:237). 
This was the initial step leading to the formal independence in 
1990. The Brazzaville and New York accords were signed soon after 
the defeat at Cuito Cuanavale. Not only did South Africa receive 
a promise that Cuban forces would withdraw from the region, it 
also gained an opportunity to re-establish the ties it had with 
the region during Vorster's period of rule (Davies in Moss and 
Obery:1990:177). However, these developments did not imply the 
demise of South Africa's two-track policy. There were reports 
from Namibia that Koevoet and the other security forces continued 
to inflict terror on the Namibian people despite the agreement. 
The UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) had delayed their 
arrival therefore failed to prevent further loss of lives and 
senseless violence. 
On the domestic front, the liberation movements of South Africa 
intensified their opposition to the white regime in the late 
1980s . The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1984 
signalled a new phase of opposition politics in which the people 
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took to the streets to openly defy the South African government. 
The Tricameral elections came under strong attack from the UDF. 
The black community also vociferously opposed the Municipal 
elections in 1988 as proof of their rejection of puppet 
councillors. The defiance campaign of the late eighties also 
played a major role in effecting change . The deployment of SADF 
troops in the townships during the three states of emergency 
created new survival tactics in the black population . Underground 
activities of banned organisations in the 1986-1988 period proved 
to be more telling on the South African government than the 
opposition of the pre-Botha era. 
Pressure not only came from the black sector of the population 
but also emanated from white dissatisfaction with the financial 
and social costs of South Africa's continued military presence 
in Namibia and Angola. The financial burden incurred by the war, 
combined with the maintenance of South African authority in 
Namibia, cost the government as much as R1 000 million a year 
(Davies and O'Meara in Chan:1990 : 205) . This vast expense was 
increasingly difficult to justify in a period of deepening 
economic depression. The high death rate of white soldiers on the 
Angolan border was unacceptable to the white voters. The 
rationale behind them being so far outside South Africa's borders 
while domestic townships became ungovernable was lost in the 
government's explanation that there was a communist threat in 
Angola. 
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The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s left that argument 
redundant. Both America and the Soviet union were experiencing 
economic and political problems. It was in their best interests 
to reduce the funding of armies and groups in Africa and 
elsewhere in the world. They therefore decided to opt for 
peaceful solutions to conflicts that previously would have been 
settled in Cold War tactics of sustained attrition. The linkage 
of Angolan sovereignty to the independence of Namibia therefore 
had its advantages. Not only did the Americans remove the Cubans 
from the region, they also inadvertently gave SWAPO the leeway 
to win the elections. SWAPO's victory therefore added another 
pro-Soviet government to the existing number in Southern Africa. 
This did not win any decisive Cold War points for either 
superpower but it did add another nail to the coffin of white 
rule in South Africa. Many analysts correctly attribute peace in 
Southern Africa to the end of the conflict between the united 
States and the Soviet union. 
International, regional and national pressures finally combined 
to force the South African government to the negotiating table. 
The crises at home and in the region, however, were far greater 
that the pressures applied by the UN, the Soviet Union, the 
Organisation for African Unity and the Western Contact Group. 
This writer holds that sophisticated liberatory movements, like 
the South African ones in the 1980's, have to be considered major 
players affecting national and, indeed, regional political 
developments. Given the policy-making history of the South 
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African government, external pressures are by no means the only 
or even major factors. 
The reasons for the failure of the international initiatives 
are many. The united Nations failed because of its limitations 
that were indavertently encapsulated in its Charter. The UN was 
virtually ineffective if a situation did not threaten the peace 
of other nations. It could only function properly if the 
agreements and recommendations were ratified by the members of 
the Security Council. This fact proved to be a major stUmbling 
block for the independence struggle of Namibia. First the US, 
then the Soviet Union would veto decision at Security Council 
level thereby stalling the process even further. This is 
supported by Rocha who claims that "the commitment on Namibia 
that the General Assembly assumed on behalf of the United Nations 
is not consistent with the power configuration in international 
relations" (1983:157). Brendan Seery also accused the UN of 
delaying the deployment of UNTAG forces and the tardy release of 
funds. The peacekeeping force had been severely trimmed reSUlting 
in a period of unnecessary violence just prior to independence 
(Moss and Obery:1990:240). 
Resolution 435 was also riddled with loopholes, a fact which the 
South Africans exploited repeatedly. 
"The 435 plan was riddled with flaws, omissions 
and obscurities, and then compounded by 
concessions to Pretoria following private 
negotiations which never received the Security 
Council's ratification" (Herbstein and 
Evenson:1991:179). 
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The New York and Brazzaville accords were influenced by the US 
delegation of the Western Contact Group. Du Pisani and Von der 
Ropp attribute the failure of the Western initiative to the non-
imposition of sanctions in 1978, the absence of an American 
representative at the Geneva meeting in 1981, and the linkage 
idea of the US in 1981 (International Affairs Bulletin 
Vol12/No2:1988:8). The presence of these countries did, however, 
prove to be one of the sources of pressure that was necessary for 
change to occur in the region. On 22 December 1988, the peace 
agreement between South Africa, Namibia and Angola was signed in 
New York. The independence process was to start on 1 April 1989, 
leading to the elections for a constituent assembly and final 
independence on 21 March 1990. 
This was not the end that everybody had anticipated. After almost 
three decades of armed warfare, the SADF and SWAPO were not 
willing to trust one another. South Africa reported a buildup of 
SWAPO forces just before April. The stipulation that SWAPO forces 
withdraw north of the 16th parallel had been ignored. Jaster 
(1990:36) states that the South African regime was not ready for 
"the biggest cross-border penetration in SWAPO's 23 year 
insurgency" on the eve of 1 April 1989 . The delay of the UNTAG 
forces facilitated this attack and the confined South African 
forces could not retaliate effectively. West Africa (No3768:6-12 
Novemeber 1989:1836), with a different ideological background to 
Jaster, reported that the independence process began with 
"a tragic episode emerging from conflicting 
interpretations of the agreements. Some of 
SWAPO's freedom fighters, the People's 
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liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), believed 
they could be 'confined to base' in Namibia 
and crossed into Namibia from Angola. The 
South African Defence Force was released 
on a manhunt that left some 300 PLAN members 
dead, and a handful seeking shelter with UNTAG 
positions" . 
SWATF forces were eventually deployed to counter the SWAPO 
attacks. The settlement was threatened by a full-scale war in the 
area. The Mount Etjo Declaration between Angola, Cuba and South 
Africa managed to get the situation under control. SWAPO members 
were to be escorted to UN monitored bases, infiltrators were 
ordered to leave the territory by the 15 April and the late UNTAG 
forces were deployed in the area (Jaster:1990:36-37). The 
conflict lasted until mid-May after which the settlement was 
resumed. 
Andre du Pisani offers an analysis of the three stages of 
Namibia's transition process: the period from 1 April 1989 to the 
certification on 14 November 1989 by Ahtisaari that the elections 
had "been free and fair", the process of constitution-making, and 
finally the "phase of state and nation building" (SA 
International Vo120/No4:1990:197). Namibia had finally reached 
its objectives after years of struggle and negotiation with the 
same party who had initiated its struggle. Ten political parties 
registered in the first democratic elections in Namibia. These 
ranged from the far right's Aksie Christelike Nasionaal to the 
left's SWAPO of Namibia. 
For many, the problems are only starting. The new South African 
government of FW De Klerk had been party to the final stages 
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after his election in 1989. He has yet to prove his support of 
the new Namibian government. what still remains under discussion, 
however, is the ownership of Walvis Bay. During the Botha era it 
had been a non-negotiable issue which had caused many set-backs 
in the independence process. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
Peter Vale recognises the fact that the 
"interaction between domestic, regional and 
international goals is the key to understading 
of the emergence - for the first time since the 
Boer War - of an integrated military-cum-political 
strategy in Southern Africa" (Chan:1990:171). 
This paper attempted to expose the relationships that existed 
between these three areas. The revised diagram in Chapter Two 
formed the basis of this study. There were substantive and 
procedural decision-making regimes in South Africa, specifically 
during the Botha era. The objectives of the policies were never 
under consideration. South Africa wanted to remain a regional 
power and wanted to maintain a white dominated, capitalist 
system. It did not anticipate the effects of pressure groups on 
its policies. Reforms occurred, not because the Botha regime 
wished to implement them, but because it was forced to do so. 
The procedural blocs are different entities in the foreign 
policy-making process. Evidence of this was the fact that South 
Africa simultaneously deployed forces in the Southern African 
region and extended diplomatic accords to the nations of 
Swaziland (1982) and Mozambique (1984). Zimbabwe did not come 
under formal attack but was subject to 'transport diplomacy' 
based on the willingness of South Africa to thrust a relationship 
of dependency upon the strongest Frontline State. 
Pressure politics therefore was the main advocate of change in 
Southern Africa. The South African government's lack of 
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legitimacy was the cause of its increased vulnerability and 
ultimately the change in the leadership of the regime in 1989. 
This leadership change brought with it a new coalition of forces 
in the decision-making regimes . The Botha years of the 
securocrats gave way to the technocrats under FW De Klerk. Once 
again, diplomacy was the order of the day . Negotiations started 
between the liberation forces in South Africa and the regime. 
Regime theory applies to the Botha era and the policies espoused 
by that government. The theories of regime vulnerability and 
fragmentation also apply to a certain extent. This paper exposes 
the great influence that a state leader's character has on the 
policy-making process. Botha's history as a military man emerged 
in his policies in Namibia and the region. His belief system and 
realist policies created major problems for the South African 
state. This was evident in the international opposition to South 
African actions. FW De Klerk, previous Minister of the Interior, 
brought with him the conciliatory politics that guided his 
portfolio in the National Party. His character, however, became 
dominant and proved that even diplomats have double agendas. 
The independence of Namibia marked the end of a colonial period 
for that country. The irony of the situation is that contrary to 
South African beliefs, a SWAPO dominated government did not 
produce policies which were communist in orientation. Namibia has 
a long road ahead of it in a region and continent that is 
becoming marginalised from the world economic system. The 
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changing policies of the Soviet Union and the US, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War have created a more 
attractive European Economic Community. Aid will be channelled 
into the EEC region because there is a greater chance of profit 
realisation there than in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Future research should take cognisance of these developments in 
the world. The chance that regional blocs will replace the North-
South and East-West divides is very great. Policy analysts will 
need to reformulate their frameworks to include these blocs and 
possibly replace international pressure inputs with inputs from 
various regional coalitions. What is obvious, however, is that 
the impact of internal opposition will remain the strongest input 
for the policy decision-making process. No amount of military 
strength and political repression will stop the process at play 
in a society. If the people of a country demand change, they can 
bring about change if they organise themselves adequately and 
harness the less influential inputs of foreign policy. 
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APPENDIX 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO.435 
ADOPTED 29 SEPTEMBER 1978 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its Resolution 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976 and 431 
(1978) and 432 (1978) of 27 July 1978, 
Having considered the report of the Secreatry General submitted 
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution 431 (1978) and his 
explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 
September 1978 (S/12869), 
Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government 
of South Africa to the Secretary General, 
Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the 
President of the South West People's Organisation (SWAPO) to the 
Secretary General, 
Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over 
Namibia: 
1. 
2 • 
Approves the report of the Secretary General 
implementation of the proposal for a settlement 
Namibian situation and his explanatory statement; 
on the 
of the 
Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal 
Africa's illegal administration from Namibia 
transfer of power to the people of Namibia 
assistance of the united Nations in accordance 
Security Council Resolution 385 (1976); 
of South 
and the 
with the 
with the 
3. Decides to establish under its authority a united Nations 
Transitional Assistnace Group in accordance with the above-
mentioned report of the Secretary General for a period of 
up to twelve monthes in order to assist his Special 
Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him 
by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of its Resolution 
431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of 
namibia through free elections under the supervision and 
control of the United Nations; 
4. Welcomes the preparedness of the South West Africa People's 
Organisation to cooperate in the implementation of the 
Secretary General's report, including its expressed 
readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as 
manifested in the letter from its President of 8 September 
1978; 
5 . Calls upon South Africa forthwith to cooperate with the 
Secretary General in the implementation of the present 
Resolution; 
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6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal 
administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral 
process, including the unilateral registration of voters, 
or transfer of power, in contravention of Resolution 385 
(1976),431 (1978) and the present Resolution, are null and 
void; 
7 • Requests the Secretary General to report 
Council not later than 23 October 
implementation of the present Resolution. 
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to the Security 
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